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Employment Preferences and Length 
of Job Queues in Pakistan: An Update
Asma Hyder
 It has long been recognised that public sector jobs are an attractive opportunity (because of 
job security, fringe benefi ts, and so on) in Pakistan’s labour market. Since the early 1990s, 
Pakistan has been going through an economic restructuring plan, particularly in terms 
of privatisation. The aim of this paper is to examine the change in the phenomenon of 
‘wait unemployment’ created due to preference for public sector jobs, using cross-section 
labour force surveys for 2001–02, 2003–04 and 2005–06. This hypothesis has been 
examined earlier only for 2001–02 (Hyder 2007). The evidence supported the view that 
unemployed people in Pakistan prefer public sector jobs, and due to this preference they 
remain unemployed for a particular period of time. However, the duration is uncompleted 
in nature. This study will provide an update on changing trends in job preferences among 
unemployed individuals based on two more recent nationwide Labour Force Surveys, for 
2003–04 and 2005–06.
Keywords: Wage Differentials, Wage Structure, Unemployment Models, Duration and 
Job Search
JEL Classifi cation: J31, J64
1. INTRODUCTION
The well-known Washington Consensus, presented by economist John 
Williamson as a joint policy advice proposed by Washington-based institutions 
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is for 
the economic recovery of Latin American countries from fi nancial crisis. 
‘Privatisation, liberalisation and stabilisation’ are the fundamentals of the 
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Washington Consensus. As in many other developing countries, the Social Action 
Program (SAP) in Pakistan is also heavily infl uenced by the policies suggested 
by the Washington twins. The privatisation process in Pakistan started actively 
after the creation of the Privatization Commission in January 1991 (Privatization 
Commission 2005). 
A fact long recognised by our technocrats and politicians is that privatisation 
is a key element in the agenda of economic growth as it embraces deregulation 
and liberalisation of the economy. Hyder (2007a) examined wage differentials 
between the public and private sectors and preferences for public sector jobs 
in Pakistan. The fi nding was that in spite of a reorientation of the economy 
towards the private sector, the competition for employment in the public sector 
remains keen,1 and unemployed individuals are queuing for public sector jobs. 
This paper is an extension of the analysis to examine the structural change in 
public sector job preferences from 2001 to 2006 using three cross-section Labour 
Force Surveys (LFS), that is, 2001–02, 2003–04 and 2005–06. 
There is a modest amount of empirical literature for developed countries 
investigating the existence of a queue for public sector jobs. The primary motive 
for testing the existence of queues is to provide indirect evidence that public 
sector workers secure higher overall compensation (Gregory and Borland 
1999). Poirier’s (1980) bivariate probit with partial observability has been used 
to provide empirical evidence on the existence of public sector job queues (for 
example, see Abowd and Farber 1982). Mengistae (1999) modifi es this approach 
to examine the evidence for such queues in Ethiopia’s urban labour market. For 
a more detailed discussion on the existing literature on this topic, see Hyder 
(2002, 2007a), Hyder and Reilly (2005) and Nasir (1998, 2002).
Public sector jobs are considered attractive not only because of wage differ-
entials and generous fringe benefi ts but also because of job security and the 
work environment. This paper examines the change in the length of the job queues 
between 2001–02 and 2004–05 by analysing public sector job preferences of a 
sample of unemployed individuals. Another objective of this paper is to study the 
relationship between public sector job preferences and an individual’s duration o
f unemployment (the present study hypothesised that the unemployment dur-
ation related to public sector jobs must decrease because of the changing trends 
of the economy towards the private competitive sector). In short, by using three 
most recent cross-sectional LFS, this paper will confi rm the hypothesis that 
1 Public sector jobs are more attractive because of fringe benefi ts; these views are discussed briefl y 
in Bilquees (2006).
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public sector job preference is a function of the public–private wage gap and 
that job preferences endogenously infl uence an individual’s unemployment 
duration. 
2. DATA
This study uses cross-section data drawn from the nationally representative 
Pakistan LFS for 2001–02, 2003–04 and 2005–06. The working sample used for 
2001–02 in wage analysis is based on those in wage employment and comprises 
a total of 7,004 workers; the working sample comprises 6,142 workers for 
2003–04 and 10,389 for 2005–06. The proportion of employees in the public 
and private sectors is given in Table 1.
Table 1 Proportion of Public and Private Sector Workers in Sample
(per cent)
Year Private Public
2001–02 52.7 47.3
2003–04 47.5 52.5
2005–06 45.0 55.0
The public sector includes federal government, provincial governments and 
local bodies. The private sector is defi ned here to include workers employed in 
private companies, cooperative societies, individual ownerships and partner-
ships. It is sometimes argued that in an analysis of the public/private sector pay 
gap in developing countries, it is desirable to disaggregate the private sector 
into formal and informal sectors.2 This is largely a matter of the investigator’s 
preference and our approach is to retain a suffi ciently broad defi nition of the 
private sector. Any disaggregation of the private sector along such lines is likely 
to be prone to potential misclassifi cation and measurement error (Hyder and 
Reilly 2005), and is thus eschewed in this study. 
The data collection for the LFS is spread over four quarters of the year in 
order to capture any seasonal variations in activity. The survey covers all the 
urban and rural areas of the four provinces of Pakistan, as defi ned by the 1998 
Census. The LFS excludes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 
military restricted areas, and protected areas of the NWFP. These exclusions 
2 This was the approach adopted by Nasir (2000) using data drawn from an earlier round of 
the LFS.
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are not seen as signifi cant since the relevant areas account for about 3 per cent 
of the total population of Pakistan. 
2.1 Variables and their Construction
Table A1 (Appendix) presents defi nitions of the variables used in this analysis. 
The natural logarithm of the hourly wage3 is used as the dependent variable 
because hours worked varies over the life cycle with the level of education and 
may also vary across sectors. Wages for the unemployed are predicted after 
estimating a regression equation on wages of employed individuals with given 
demographics and characteristics. 
In order to examine the relationship between earnings and age from the 
perspective of human capital theory, age and its quadratic are used in the spe-
cifi cations. These measures are actually designed to proxy for labour force 
experience, which cannot be accurately measured using our data source. This 
analysis is restricted to those aged between 15 and 60 years. The age-restricted 
approach provides a more worthwhile comparison between public and private 
sector workers, given the public sector retirement age. The marital status of a 
respondent is divided into two categories, married and never married. The category 
‘never married’ includes all individuals who have never married, or are widowed 
or divorced. The settlement type where the individual resides is captured by a 
binary control for residing in an urban area. Four regional controls are included 
and these capture the four provinces in Pakistan—Punjab, Balochistan, Sind and 
the NWFP. Again, a binary control is introduced to capture the relocation ef-
fect of a respondent’s time spent in the current district. The notion here is that 
location-specifi c human capital and social networks may be important in the 
wage determination process, particularly in the private sector. 
Six categories are introduced to examine the effects of education. The highest 
category is ‘degree’ which comprises everyone who has a college degree, a master’s 
degree, an M.Phil or Ph.D. The category for training shows if individuals have 
received any type of training, although our approach does not distinguish be-
tween on-the-job or specifi c training. 
2.2 Summary Statistics
Tables A2 and A3 (Appendix) present details of all the variables with their 
summary statistics for employed individuals in each sector of economy and 
unemployed individuals, respectively. 
3 The hourly wages, expressed in rupees, were calculated by dividing weekly earnings by number 
of hours worked per week.
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Female labour force participation is low in Pakistan. On the basis of our 
sample, in 2001–02 and 2003–04, only 12 per cent of public sector and about 
10 per cent of waged employees in the private sector were women. This fi gure 
increased to 15 per cent in the private sector during 2005–06. The inclusion of 
women in our empirical analysis is a judgment call. The proportion of employed 
individuals in the private sector increased signifi cantly in the sample, particularly 
in Punjab and Sindh in 2005–06 compared to 2001–02. An increasing trend of 
relocation can also be discerned due to a 4 per cent decrease in the number of 
people living in that district since birth. 
There is signifi cant increase in the proportion of unemployed individuals with 
maximum duration,4 that is, more than 12 months. Similarly, the proportion of 
relocated individuals increased among the sample of unemployed. The pro-
portion of unemployed (without any preference) has increased in all provinces, 
with the highest increase in Sindh. The proportion of heads of households 
among unemployed individuals decreased in the total sample. 
3. METHODOLOGY
The approach adopted in this paper is the same as used by Hyder (2007b) and, 
for convenience, the methodology is reported here in brief.5 Our econometric 
model comprises two equations: a public sector job preference equation and an 
unemployment duration equation. Assume y∗
1i
 is a latent variable that captures 
an individual’s preference for a public sector job. It is assumed to be related to 
a set of explanatory variables (x
i
) using the following relationship:6
 where u
i 
~ N(0, 1) (1)
The x
i 
vector is assumed to include the individual’s predicted wage offer gap 
between a public and private sector job. Let y
1i
 denote an observable binary 
variable that conveys information on whether an individual has a preference 
for a public sector job, which is denoted as y
1i
 = 1 if this is the case, and y
1i
 = 0 
if not. The relationship between the latent variable and the observed variable is 
y x ui i1 1
∗ = ′ +β
4 This duration is uncompleted in nature.
5 The same model specifi cation is used by Hyder in her Ph.D. dissertation. 
6 The wage equations estimated in this paper are not corrected for selectivity bias, because of the 
unavailability of instrumental variables for identifi cation in LFS. In previous studies by the same 
author, the head of household is used for identifi cation, but this variable is signifi cant when used 
in the wage equation. Family background or parental background information are best for such 
analysis as suggested by Heckman (1979), but these are not available in the LFS.
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given by y
1i
 = 1 if y∗
1i
 > 0, and y
1i
 = 0 if y∗
1i
 ≤ 0. This application can be formulated 
as a simple binary probit model and the specifi cation of the log likelihood 
function is now discussed.
The model described in equation (1) shows that the probability of preferring 
a public sector job is Φ(x'β ) and independent observations lead to the joint 
probability, or likelihood function,
  Prob (Y
1i =1, 2, ...n
|x) = [ ( )] ( )1
1 0 1 1
− ′ ′
= =
∏ ∏Φ Φx xi
y i
i
y i
β β  (2)
The likelihood function for a sample of n observations can be written as:
  L β β βdata x x
i
n
i
y i
i
y i= ′ − ′
=
−∏[ ( )] [ ( )]Φ Φ
1
1 1 11  (3)
By taking the log of the above equation, we obtain the following log likelihood 
equation:
 lnL =
=
∑{y i
i
n
1
1
ln Φ( ) ( )′ + −x yi iβ 1 1  ln [ ( )]}1− ′Φ xiβ  (4)
Φ(.) represents the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal. 
The unemployment duration variable is expressed in discrete intervals meas-
ured in months. Let y∗
2i 
denote an underlying latent dependent variable that 
captures the ith individual’s unemployment duration. This can be expressed 
as a linear function of a vector of explanatory variables (z
i
) using the following 
relationship:
 
  y∗
2i 
= ′ +z ei iγ  where ei ~ N(0, σ2) (5)
It is assumed that y∗
2i 
is related to the observable ordinal variable y
2i 
as follows:
 y
2i 
= 0 if –∞ < y∗
2i 
≤ a
1
 y
2i 
= 1 if a
1 
< y∗
2i 
< a
2
 y
2i 
= 2 if a
2 
≤ y∗
2i 
< a
3   
 y
2i
 = 3 if a
3 
≤ y∗
2i 
< a
4
 y
2i
 = 4 if a
4 
≤ y∗
2i 
< +∞ 
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where a
j
 are known threshold values. This application can be formulated as an 
interval regression (or grouped dependent variable) model and the specifi cation 
of the log likelihood function can be written as:
  
 log log{ [ ] [ ]}L
a ak i
i k
j
k i= − ′ − ′
∈=
−∑∑ Φ Ζ Φ Ζβσ βσ04 1  (6)
Following Stewart (1983), we treat the fi rst and the last intervals as open-ended 
in this case; so for j = 0, Φ(a
j
) = Φ(–∞) = 0, and for j = 4, Φ(a
j
) = Φ(+∞) = 1, where 
Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The estimated results are discussed in order. 
4.1 Wage Equations
The primary purpose for estimation of wage equations (results presented in 
Table A 4, Appendix) is as a prediction of wages for unemployed individuals in 
job queues. Thus, our model specifi cation does not include the occupational 
categories because we do not have information about occupational preferences 
of the unemployed. Starting from gender, the estimated effect of being male 
in the private sector was 0.49 percentage points in 2001–02; it decreased to 
0.40 percentage points in 2005–06. This shows the decrease in gender wage 
discrimination in the private sector. ‘Age’ and ‘age square’ are used as proxies 
for experience. These two variables have expected signs and magnitudes that 
are consistent with the theory. 
The estimated effects of all educational categories remain almost unchanged 
in the public sector, but fell slightly in the private sector in 2002–03 and increased 
in 2005–06. To capture the residential effect, our model includes four provincial 
dummies and one urban dummy. The estimated effect of the category ‘Punjab’ 
decreased for the private sector, which shows the changing trends of expansion 
and competitiveness in this sector in Punjab compared to the omitted category 
‘Balochistan’. The estimated coeffi cients for NWFP are diffi cult to interpret for 
2005–06, and the ambiguous results are clearly an outcome of the drastic con-
ditions in the province after the September 2005 earthquake in the northern 
areas of Pakistan. 
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4.2 Job Preference Equations: Probit Estimates
Table A5 (Appendix) presents the results of job preference equations for three 
years, 2001–02, 2003–04 and 2005–06. The coeffi cient of ‘wage differential’ is 
positive and signifi cant in all three years, in all job preference equations. This 
shows that wage differentials between the public and private sectors play an 
important role in an unemployed individual’s job preferences in Pakistan. 
The public sector in Pakistan is generally considered ineffi cient because it 
is overstaffed. The immediate impact of privatisation and the consequences 
of private sector unemployment due to downsizing are unavoidable. This is 
responsible for increasing fears of job loss, particularly in the private sector 
(see Khan [2003] for a more detailed discussion on the impact of privatisation 
on employment). There is a modest amount of literature available supporting 
the statement that in the short run, privatisation grounds unemployment and 
fall in wages (Gupta et al. 1999). The time period under consideration in this 
study does not show any signifi cant change in job preference from the public 
sector to the private sector. 
In Punjab, the probability of preferring a public sector job is lower than in 
Balochistan, which is an omitted category. This result seems logical, based on 
the competition for public sector jobs in Punjab and a more established pri-
vate sector there which can absorb unemployed individuals. These two factors 
provide a signifi cant explanation for low public sector job preferences as com-
pared to Balochistan. 
4.3 Length of Job Queues: Interval Regression Estimates
Table A5 (Appendix) presents interval regression estimates. There are few sig-
nifi cant changes in the results between 2001–02 and 2005–06. For all three years, 
with the increase in the level of education, the duration of unemployment also 
increases. This is because as the level of education increases, the expectation of 
getting a suitable or desired job also increases. With higher levels of education, 
people expect to get better jobs and so they prefer to remain unemployed for a 
specifi c period of time and spend this time in job search. It is recognised that 
there are many other causes of lengthening job queues.7 But these job preferences 
7 A comment by Dr Surjit Bhalla (Oxus Research and Investment, India) on an earlier version 
of this paper presented at the 22nd Annual General Meeting and Conference, 2006), was that an 
important factor in lengthening job queues may be corruption, bribery, etc. The author agrees 
with this point but the unavailability of information on this variable in our data set prevented 
us from exploring the effects of this variable. Thus, this study is restricted to the analysis of the 
duration of unemployment due to job preferences. 
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are an important cause of lengthening the job queues or creating the phenomena 
of ‘wait unemployment’ in the economy. This is evident from our estimated 
results that individuals with a low level of education a have minimum duration 
of unemployment; this result is obvious as unemployed individuals with a low 
level of education may not have a strong job preference. 
The preference for public sector jobs signifi cantly affects the duration of 
unemployment. The estimated coeffi cient of this variable is about four months’ 
duration due to job preference for 2001–02, which decreased to about three 
months in 2003–04, and further to about one month in 2005–06. These esti-
mated results show a decrease in preferences for public sector jobs among the 
unemployed. Another explanation for the decrease in preference for public sec-
tor jobs may be the dearth of jobs in that sector. It is also pointed out by Gupta 
et al. (1999) that after privatisation, the immediate impact on the economy 
is a loss of employment, fi rst due to downsizing and second when suffi cient 
investment is not injected into the economy. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The study provides a relationship between job preferences and duration of 
unemployment. It provides a comparative analysis using three recent cross-
section labour force surveys. The estimated results support the hypothesis 
that unemployed individuals prefer public sector jobs, the level of preferences 
increases in terms of duration of unemployment with the increase in the level 
of education. 
Another main objective of this study is to provide a comparative analysis 
of three different surveys. The results do not show any signifi cant change in job 
preference during the time period under consideration. The only signifi cant 
change in the estimated results was for the NWFP which yielded an unclear 
coeffi cient for 2005–06, clearly because of low economic activity due to the 
2005 earthquake in the region. The negligible differences in results for the three 
cross-section surveys may be because of too short a time period;8 fi ve years is a 
very short time to examine a structural changes in the economy. 
8 The unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Yasmeen (2007) provides a comparative analysis of two 
labour force surveys, 1990–91 and 2001–02, to examine the change in employment opportunities 
due to trade liberalisation. Her statistics shows that there is no change in employment opportunities 
during this time period due to trade policies as these policies are part of the structural adjustment 
program in Pakistan.
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